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Abstract
The availability of affordable housing in the United States continues to be an issue for
Americans who are on the brink of homelessness, rely on housing subsidies, or struggle to pay
their mortgages or rents. These issues, as well as the gentrification threat that community
development poses to low-income residents can have deleterious effects on democratic
participation and community development efforts. One proposed solution to these problems is
the implementation of more community land trust programs nationally. This paper will assess the
practicality of CLTs, and what such an implementation would mean for individuals, government
entities, community members, and community development efforts.
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Introduction
The current housing market, as well as the conceptualization of housing as a commodity
in the United States is exploitative and damaging to both low-income citizens and society as a
whole. Under such a housing system, community development tends to push low-income
residents out of their communities through a process known as gentrification. In the following
paper I will outline the problems which perpetuate the affordable housing crisis in the United
States, and consider an alternative approach to affordable housing through the implementation of
community land trusts (CLTs).
What is the Problem?
Between 1984 and 2014 the average cost of living in the United States has increased by
over 83%. If we look only at the cost of shelter, that alone has increased over 113% (Bureau of
Labor Statistics). This would not be so alarming if incomes kept pace with the increasing costs.
But, between 1984 and 2014 the median income for U.S. households has increased by just over
13% controlling for inflation (U.S. Census Bureau). These trends suggest that it is becoming
increasingly difficult for Americans to  make enough money to meet their needs, and the cost of
housing plays a significant role in that disparity.
According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, “a household should
pay no more than 30 percent of its annual income on housing.”(United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development no date). Nonetheless, in 2006, 39 million households paid
more than 30% of their income for their housing. Of this number, almost 17 million paid more
than 50 percent of their income to cover housing expenses (Joint Center For Housing Studies of
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Harvard University [JCHSHU] 2008). Eight years later, The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014, 3)
found that the average share of income devoted to housing was over 30% for every type of
household composition (married/with children/one parent/single/etc.).
Such a high proportion of a family income devoted to housing undermines a family’s
capacity to pay for food, medical care, and other necessities. The low-income households with
children that paid more than 30% of their limited income on housing, have an average of $257 a
month left over for food, $29 for clothing, and $9 for healthcare (JCHSHU 2008). The increasing
cost of housing has far reaching impacts on families: Whether a family can afford to live in a
safe community with a good education system; the livability of their homes; how far one is
forced to live from their work, and how much one has to spend on travel costs; as well as how
much money is leftover to pay for other needs, are all consequences of housing costs. As this
pertains to community development: We cannot realistically expect community members to be
democratically involved in the community, and contribute to a bottom-up development approach
when they are in a continuous struggle for their own survival. A solution to the affordable
housing problem is needed to improve the economic situation of all community members, as
well as to help garner more civic participation.
Why is there a Problem?
The rising cost of housing is the result of a number of factors working together,
including: the rising mortgage interest rates; community improvements leading to higher land
values and taxation; and increasing construction costs (Conaty, and Lewis 2014). Each of these
factors are linked to the current political economy which conceptualizes housing as a commodity
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to be traded and profited from. This conceptualization of need as a commodity is not unique to
housing. It is also expressed in food sales, the provision of water through utilities, education, and
medical care.
The primary difference between housing and other commodified needs is the desire, as
well as the ability, of each subsequent seller of a property to profit without contributing any real
investment to the property themselves. Each time a property is sold, the seller has the potential to
gain windfall profits from the increased value of land because of community developments, or
the increased demand for housing, since the time of purchase. The only commodities that are
remotely similar to housing in this respect are historical artifacts, antiques, and collectibles that
increase in value with each passing year because of their increasing rarity and age (if kept in
good order). The widespread conception of housing as a commodified investment undercuts the
viability of affordable housing in a free market system by allowing landowners to continually
profit off of community improvements and the universal, unnegotiable necessity of shelter.
How are We Solving the Problem?
Homerenter Subsidies. The United States’ affordable housing problem is not necessarily being
solved, but adapted to. More Americans are renting rather than purchasing homes, contributing
to rising rental demand and prices (Towey 2009). Additionally, the federal and state government
is subsidizing both low-income rental units and home purchases. Rental subsidy vouchers are
either paid to the renter or the property owner. The vouchers usually cover either the full cost of
the market price of the rental, or the difference between 30% of the renter’s annual income and
the market value of the rental. When paid directly to the property owner, the landlord must set
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aside a decided number housing units that can only be rented by low-income tenants. Whether
the money is coming from the individual, or the government, the property owner is still being
paid at market-rate (Towey 2009).
Sometimes the construction of new housing developments are heavily subsidized under
the conditions that they will provide new low-income housing units, only to opt-out when the
contract expires (Bagdol 2013). Additionally, local municipalities sometimes give land to private
developers at no cost because of the possibility of an increased tax base through the
development’s residents, and a higher land value for the surrounding area (Hoover 2015, 1102).
Through incentives like these, as well as through the rental subsidy system, individuals are
getting a place to stay, but property owners still profit. In short, the need for affordable housing
in the U.S. is being treated as a personal problem, not a social issue. While providing housing for
individuals, rental subsidies do not do anything to ameliorate the economic exploitation of
people with compulsory housing needs by the speculative determining of housing market-rates.
Homeowner Subsidies. Low-income homeowner subsidies differ from rental subsidies. At the
time of a property’s purchase, government entities “often provide financial support through
down payment assistance or a similar cash outlay (Davis 2006).[....] In order to protect the public
investment and ensure continued afford-ability, local governments attempt to recoup the initial
subsidy when the owner sells the home (Institution for Community Economics no date).” This
model of subsidy distribution eases the burden on new low-income homeowners. Unlike the
rental model, the subsidy is not lost to the property owner forever, but is eventually returned to
the government with a portion of the realize appreciation of the home. Despite this repayment,
any of these subsidized properties can be sold at market value, thus decreasing the pool of
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affordable housing in the community. Because of a property’s appreciation, and the increasing
costs of development, recaptured funds are likely to be insufficient to cover the cost of a new
affordable unit (Conaty, and Lewis 2014; Towey 2009).
To be fair, the current system of housing subsidies is far better than the preceding method
of public housing projects that concentrated the poorest residents into squalid ghettos. With that
said, the current rental subsidy program only spreads exploitative costs from the renter to the
taxpayers. While homeowner subsidy programs are not as bad, they still produce a net loss for
taxpayers. To benefit community development efforts, as well as the well-being of the collective
residents of the United States, we need to find a more efficient way to provide decent affordable
housing.
Community Development and Gentrification: A Double-edged Sword
In general, community development is considered to be a benevolent practice that aims to
leverage community resources and improve the quality of life for all stakeholders. However,
when community improvements are made, the speculated market value of the surrounding land
increases. Not only does this increase home prices, but also taxes and rental rates. For example,
between 1990 and 2000, “the median housing price in five gentrifying neighborhoods in Atlanta
rose from $48,200 to $116,700” (Bagdol 2013, 944). Similarly, in the Sawmill community of
Albuquerque, NM; between 1995 and 2005 property values increased from $1.05 to $4.10 per
square foot (Bagdol 2013, 945).  While an improving community may mean a higher standard of
living for many residents, it also means revenue or profits for municipalities, developers, and
quick-selling property owners (Turnbull 2009, 23). On the other hand, for low-income families it
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can mean forced displacement (Hoover 2014, 1098). This forced displacement because of an
area’s increasing cost of living is the central issue of gentrification (Bagdol 2013, 944).
The tragedy of gentrification is this: Even when a bottom-up approach to community
development is taken, and community members of all income levels work together to improve
their community, the low-income residents who have the most to gain are invariably forced out
of the community once the improvements are realized. Additionally, because of the positive
correlation between racial discrimination and economic inequality in the U.S., historically
gentrification has usually meant the displacement of Black people in favor of whites (Gray and
Galande 2011; Kennedy and Leonard 2001). Furthermore, the possibility of gentrification
disincentivizes community support of, or participation in the community development process.
This raises questions about the practicality of the bottom-up approach to development. When
development only benefits those wealthy enough to stay, every low-income resident will have a
reason to fight against it.
In sum, the latent negative effects of community development tend to contradict the very
goals of development by discouraging community involvement and by separating resources from
the people who need them the most. This serves to perpetuate economic and racial segregation,
preserving inequality. In the following sections of this paper I will consider the merits and
pitfalls of a promising affordable housing option that has been gaining traction in the United
States since the inception of the “New Communities” community land trust in Albany, Georgia
in 1967 (Gray 2008, 70).
Community Land Trusts (CLTs)
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A community land trust is “a private nonprofit corporation created to acquire and hold
land for the benefit of a community and provide secure affordable access to land and housing for
the community residents” (The Institute for Community Economics [ICE] 1982). CLTs offer a
form of community development that is unique in their approach to real estate ownership, and
their approach to citizen governance (ICE 1982). CLTs acquire properties by either purchasing
them with donated funds and government grants, or by acquiring them from the municipal
government at no cost for the creation of affordable housing units. Foreclosed and abandoned
properties in poor neighborhoods are usual targets for CLT acquisition because of their low price
and the difference their rehabilitation would mean for the neighborhood. Once a dwelling is
rehabilitated or built on the property, it is sold to a low-income homebuyer with a few
conditions: First, the CLT maintains ownership over the land “in trust”. This is the defining
characteristic of CLTs. The separation of land from dwellings significantly reduces the initial
purchase price of the home, often by 70-75% (Bagdol 2013, 942; Turnbull 2009, 26), making
decent homes more affordable to low-income buyers. Homeowners lease the land that the
dwelling is on for a nominal fee like $25 per month (Miller 2015). Additionally, when the
homeowner decides to sell their home, they will not earn windfall profits from increased land
value due to improvements in the surrounding community. This caveat is huge in preventing
personal profiteering from public community development efforts (Pastel 1991).
A second condition to CLT homeownership is that homeowners enter into a 99 year
renewable and transferable contract with the CLT that stipulates that the homeowner may only
sell the home to a low-income individual, or at a price equatable with what they had paid for the
home themselves (CLTs differ in specific practices). In conjunction, the two conditions above
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serve to secure affordable housing for decades to come. The dwelling on the CLT property will
remain affordable no matter what improvements are made to the surrounding community and no
matter how many times it is resold.
The Issue of Property Taxes
The only uncertainty for the homeowner is what this means for their property taxes. Most
municipalities are not yet familiar with the CLT model, and cooperation by tax assessors is not
universal. Some assessors have determined that either the CLT or the homeowner needs to pay
taxes on the full market rate of the property. Other assessors waive property taxes on CLT land
completely. A middle option is for CLT homeowners to pay the property tax at the level reserved
for affordable housing units, rather than the market-rate. This option helps to maintain the
affordability of the CLT home while making a modest contribution to the community’s tax base
(Bagdol 2013).
Criticisms of CLTs
CLTs Restrict Wealth Building. For many Americans, homeownership is considered to be the
main avenue to wealth building. If one can afford to purchase a home, especially one in an “up
and coming” area, it is very likely that the property will increase in value as development efforts
improve the community over time. The constraints that CLTs put on how much a homeowner
can make from selling their CLT home is off-putting to Americans looking for an easy way to
increase their wealth. “Most ground leases allow the original price to increase by 25% of any
increase in the market value of the home (Bagdol 2013, 943).” Additionally, if CLT homeowners
decide to sell their home and move to a place without a CLT, it is unlikely that the profits from
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their CLT home will cover the entire cost of another house at market value. This argument
against CLTs is not completely valid. First, CLT homeowners tend to be first time homeowners
who would not otherwise be able to afford a house at market value. They do not usually have the
option of buying a house at market value. Second, CLT homes provide a much more stable
environment for wealth building than market value homes. “In 2008, the foreclosure rate of CLT
homes was 0.52% compared with the national rate of 3.3% (Bagdol 2013, 943; Miller 2015,
371).”
CLTs Restrict Tax Revenue. Another criticism of CLTs is their cost to the government. CLTs
tend to be funded, at least in part, by government grants and subsidies. Additionally, the waiving
or reduction of market value property taxes reduces the tax revenue per capita for municipalities.
This means that CLT homeowners financially contribute less to the maintenance and creation of
community resources, namely public education, than market value homeowners. If a large
proportion of housing in one community was CLT homes, municipalities could find that the
small amount that they are now getting from property taxes is insufficient to maintain an
adequate public education system (Bagdol 2013).
A retort to the criticism that CLTs restrict tax revenue is: First, CLTs are much more
financially efficient than the current rental and homeowner subsidy models outlined in the
introduction of this paper. Research done by Conaty and Lewis (2014, 38) shows that over 30
years, the public cost of a CLT home subsidy would be $50,000 (the initial sale price). Over the
same time, a home with the same market value as the CLT home would require $820,000 in
government subsidies to remain affordable. Government funds need to continually be added to
subsidies because with the increase in property value, more subsidy money is necessary to keep a

11

market value house affordable each time it is sold (see homeowners subsidy section of this
paper) (Towey 2009). Second, CLT homes usually start as foreclosed or abandoned homes, from
which no tax revenue is being generated. When CLTs remodel these homes, a contribution is
made to the improvement of the entire community. CLT homes can function like other
improvements, raising property values and tax revenue in the surrounding area. Third, steps can
be taken to restructure taxation so low residential tax revenue does not necessarily mean
underfunded public school programs. Vermont is one state that has accomplished this by
increasing corporate, gasoline, and cigarette tax, as well as diverting surplus tax revenue in
wealthier municipalities to a state fund that is redistributed to municipalities that are more in
need. This sort of program makes decent education available to children, even if their parents
cannot afford to live in a high cost school district (Bagdol 2013).
CLTs and Community Organizing
Community land trusts utilize a unique technique for ensuring that community interests
are held at the center of their role in development. CLT board of directors are usually equally
composed of three different groups of people: CLT homeowners, residents of the CLT
community, and other interested parties like social service providers, public officials, etc. (Gray
2008). This balance of representation expresses a dedication to community involvement and
participation.
Community land trusts can also operate as an avenue for community organizing. Many
CLTs provide educational classes, forums for community members to discuss local issues, and
are points of contact between community members and the police and other resource centers.
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These services help to develop lasting neighborhood leadership that is able to do things like
lobby or campaign for the CLT to become a permanent part of the city budget, for a better
housing policy, and for fair CLT homeowner property taxes (Gray and Galande 2011, 247).
Conclusion
Affordable housing continues to be a point of struggle and a main decider of livelihood
and well being for many Americans. The way the U.S. government currently handles the
problem of affordable housing is simplistic, wasteful, and supports the continued profiteering off
of human needs and community improvements by landowners. The implementation of
community land trusts in America has the potential to open the possibility of homeownership up
to millions of low-income residents. CLTs offer an option for maintaining the affordability of
subsidized homes in perpetuity without the need for additional subsidy investments. Through
their community revitalization and organizing efforts, CLTs can also serve as inherently place
based and inclusive community development organizations. All these factors suggest that
community land trusts are helpful to community development. However, a city that decides to
adopt the CLT model as a major mode of community development and/or affordable housing
provision will need to tailor its tax policy to this new system. Community development
improvements that sometimes lead to higher property values, taxation, and gentrification would
now garner a smaller portion of tax revenue. Municipalities need to balance the potential benefits
and costs that CLTs bring to community development efforts with each unique political and
economic context.
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